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Theeconomy of South Korea has grown very rapidly since 1963. The average
annual rate of growth of GNP between 1963 and 1972 was about 9.6 percent.
Exports have grown even faster, from $87 million in 1963 to $1.6 billion in
1972, and to about $3.2 billion in 1973. The annual rate of growth of exports
averaged 38.9 percent between 1963 and 1972 and reached a peak of almost
100 percent in 1973, a very remarkable rate of increase.
This volume examines the relationship between trade and exchange rate
policies and the rapid growth of South Korean output and trade. Of particular
interest are the attempts to liberalize trade policy and the exchange rate sys-
tern and the effects of these efforts on resource allocation and growth.
There are a few easy explanations that might be given for the growth of
Korean trade. For example, South Korea's economy was devastated by both
World War II and the Korean War. Between 1953 (when the Korean War
ended) and 1960, exports averaged only 1.1 to 2.4 percent of GNP, although
a country of South Korea's population and income might have been expected
to reach a much higher level of exports, perhaps one of at least 10 or 15 per-
cent of GNP. Thus one explanation of South Korea's export performance is
to say that what appears to be growth is really a case of "catching-up" to
some "normal" level. By 1971, however, South Korean exports had surpassed
the level that is usual in countries of similar population and income.' Exports
reached about 26 percent of GNP in 1973 and showed little tendency toward
less rapid expansion. While early growth of exports might be attributed in part
simply to "catching-up," continued growth remains to be explained. Further-




found in other countries of similar size and income. Almost all her exports
are manufactured and as a fraction of GNP they are exceedingly high corn-
pared with the proportion of manufactures exported by other less developed g
countries.
Other easy explanations could be imagined: for example, South Korea's p
exports may have been boosted by war in Viet Narn. In fact, only a tiny frac- a
tion of South Korea's exports have been destined for Viet Nam or were in any
way related to the hostilities there. Alternatively, one might attribute South
Korea's export growth to government targets. While such targets have played
a role, it is unlikely that they are the sole or even the major reason exports 1
grew so rapidly. Unless incentives to export accompany targets, firms will be
driven out of business if continuously forced to export, at a loss, an increasing
proportion of their output.
Growth in income has also been explained in various ways. The most i
commonly accepted easy explanation is that South Korean growth is due to II
very high levels of foreign aid. Foreign aid has been important, especially e:
from 1953 to 1963. Domestic savings averaged only about 3 percent of GNP fi
during those years, while foreign savings (imports of goods and services less c
exports of goods and services financed mostly by foreign aid grants) aver- ri
aged 9 percent of GNP. Approximately three-quarters of total investment
was financed by foreign aid. Those were the years, however, when economic I
growth was relatively slow in South Korea. The rate of growth of GNP aver-
aged about 5percent.After 1964 domestic savings grew very rapidly, rising s
from about 4 percent of GNP to almost 17 percent in 1970. The fraction of t
total investment financed domestically rose from less than one-third in 1963
to about 63 percent in 1970. Furthermore, beginning in 1965, foreign capital
imports took less the form of foreign aid and more the form of commercial
loans. By 1969, well over half of all foreign loan agreements in that year were
commercial. The period of decreasing reliance on foreign aid, 1964 to 1970, i
was also a period of accelerated growth, the annual rate over the period aver-
aging close to 11 percent. I
No doubt foreign assistance has been important to South Korea's eco-
nomic growth. But to attribute rapid growth solely to massive foreign aid
would be a mistake, for South Korea's economic policies have played a role
too. They have ensured the effective use of foreign resources while increasing i
the domestic contribution to the process of growth.
In this volume we shall concentrate on the function of trade and ex-
change rate policies. South Korea has followed a set of policies which are 1
unusual compared with those of most less developed countries. Instead of
emphasizing import substitution, most policy initiatives have promoted ex-
ports. A wide variety of export incentive schemes has been devised, and the
exchange rate has been adjusted frequently and dramatically. During most of
the period since 1967, exchange rate policy has been based on the gliding peg.INTRODUCTION 3
Chapter 2 of this volume is a brief economic history of South Korea
since World War II. It is largely descriptive and intended as general back-
ground for the rest of the book.
Chapter 3 deals with phases I and II of the Bhagwati-Krueger scheme.2
Phase I begins with the end of World War II and ends with the Korean War
C- armistice signed in 1953. The government was directly involved in trade and
controlled what little private trade existed. There was a multiplicity of cx-
th change rates and a flourishing black market in foreign exchange and military
ed payment certificates. Phase II lasted from the end of the Korean War until
ts 1960. It was a period of increasingly sophisticated control mechanisms and
—be complicated procedures which were invented to assist barter trade and to
facilitate trade payments.
• Chapter 4 covers two Phase III attempts at liberalization, the first from
1961 to 1962, the second from 1964 to 1965. A steep devaluation declared
to in 1961 was followed by an abortive effort to unify exchange rates and to lib-
ly eralize trade policy. But a bad crop in 1962 combined with the expansionary
FP fiscal policies of the military government, which had ousted the reformist
ss civilian administration in May 1961, led to a return in 1963 to a Phase II
regime with multiple rates and stringent controls on trade.
nt A much more successful attempt to realize a Phase III liberalization
ic began in May 1964 with a devaluation of the won close to 50 percent and
r- continued through September 1965, when domestic interest rates were sub-
stantially raised. The multiple exchange rate system was unified, trade restric-
tions were eased, and tax administration reformed.
'3 Chapter 4 also covers 1966, the first year of a Phase IV regime in which
al efforts were made to consolidate reforms. Chapter 5 analyzes the continuation
al of the Phase IV regime from 1967 to early 1973. During this period, tariffs
were revised and the trade control program was changed in 1967 from a
), •positive-listto a more liberal negative-list system. The won was allowed to
"glide" from early 1968 to mid-1971, i.e.,it floated downward at a deter-
mined rate which was meant to be consistent with rates of inflation in Korea
and in her major trading partners. The won was again devalued in June 1971
d and was floated again during the first half of 1972. In August 1972, a new set
Le of reforms involved price stabilization, pegging the exchange rate at about 400
g won to the dollar. There was also a tendency during this period to resort to
the old price-distorting practices whenever the balance of payments was under
pressure. Trade controls were alternately strengthened and relaxed. The num-
•e ber and level of export subsidy measures increased until early 1973.
Chapter 6 is an analysis of Korea's export growth and treats this subject
in some detail. Besides discussing the import-intensity of export production,
ie we also analyze the role of exchange rates, export subsidies, and other incen-
tives in stimulating exports. The degree to which exports are responsible for
the growth of the South Korean economy, sector by sector, is described by
a4 INTRODUCTION
means of various decomposition techniques. South Korea's growth patterns are exch
compared with those of other countries to demonstrate the relatively pre- paci
dominant role of exports in the South Korean economy. ing
Foreign capital inflows have been very important in South Korea's
growth. Immediately after the Korean War, most of the capital inflow con- fro
sisted of foreign aid grants. By the mid-I 960s, private commercial loans The
became important. Chapter 7 analyzes the part played by foreign capital in mm
South Korea's growth and the efficiency of the foreign capital inflow.
In Chapter 8, we develop an econometric model of the South Korean
economy. The estimation of the model involves the testing of a number of NO
hypotheses concerning the role of exchange rates and commercial policy vari-
ables on aggregate behavioral relationships in the economy. Chapter 9 uses
the econometric model to determine whether alternative sets of commercial
K policies would have resulted in more or less growth over the decade of the
1960s. The simulations in Chapter 9 examine the optimality of South Korea's
exchange rate policy, tariff levels, and levels of export subsidy in a macro-
economic framework.
In Chapter 10, we discuss the efficiency of the South Korean trade and
exchange rate regime. The analysis of efficiency involves first the measurement
of nominal protection rates by means of a survey of price comparisons of
world market and domestic prices. The nominal protection rates are used to
estimate the effective protection of some 150 sectors of the economy. We go
beyond measures of effective protection to estimates of rates of effective sub-
sidy which include a wide range of taxes and subsidies to industry in addition
to tariff rates. In Chapter 10 we also investigate the labor and capital intensity
of South Korea's exports and the effect of valuation at domestic prices, or at
international prices, on the growth and structure of the economy.
Chapter 11 provides an overview. The first two sections examine the
effects of rapid growth on employment and income distribution. Since these
topics are not closely related to trade policy, they do not readily lend them-
selves to treatment in the main text. We felt, however, that a book on Korean•
development would be sorely inadequate if it omitted discussion of employ-
ment and income distribution.
The next six sections of Chapter 11 consider the factors responsible for
growth in Korea with particular reference to trade and exchange rate policies.
We draw on the results of research presented in the preceding chapters as
much as possible. To a certain extent, however, we must take a broader view
of the growth process in order to provide a proper context for the analysis
of the role of exchange rates and trade policy. Thus we talk about education
and literacy, political regimes, the influence of Japanese culture, and other
important factors that help to determine economic policies. Furthermore, we
cannot hope to be definitive within this volume even with respect to trade and
I —;_-- .NOTES 5
ire exchange rate policies because of limitations on data, time, and research ca-
pacity. Therefore, some of the observations in Chapter 11, even those involv-
ing trade and exchange rate policy, are speculative.
a's The final section of Chapter 11 offers some caveats about generalizing
a- from the South Korean experience and drawing lessons for other countries.





es I. See Bhagwati and Cheh (1972). See also the analysis of exports in Chapter 6.
• 2. For a description of the Bhagwati-Krueger five-phase scheme, see Bhagwati and
• Krueger (1970) and also the description of the phases in Appendix A.
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